Abstract. Under the assumption of a certain conjecture, for which there exists strong experimental evidence, we produce an efficient algorithm for constructive membership testing in the Suzuki groups Sz(q), where q = 2 2m+1 for some m > 0, in their natural representations of degree 4. It is a Las Vegas algorithm with running time O(log(q)) field operations, and a preprocessing step with running time O(log(q) log log(q)) field operations. The latter step needs an oracle for the discrete logarithm problem in Fq.
Introduction
A goal of the matrix recognition project is to develop efficient algorithms for the study of subgroups of GL(d, q). The classification due to Aschbacher (see [1] ) provides one framework for this, and the first aim is to develop an algorithm that finds a composition series of a matrix group given by a set of generators. It is possible to do this with a recursive algorithm, and the recursion is described in [16] . However, we still have to deal with the base cases, which are the finite simple groups.
For each base case we need to perform parts of constructive recognition. The simple group is given as G = X where X ⊆ GL(d, q) for some d, q and constructive recognition encompasses the following problems:
(1) The problem of recognition or naming of G, i.e. decide the name of G, as in the classification of the finite simple groups. ( 2) The constructive membership problem. Given g ∈ GL(d, q), decide whether or not g ∈ G, and if so express g as a word (or SLP, see Section 3.2) in X. (3) Construct an isomorphism ψ from G to a standard copy H of G such that ψ(g) and ψ −1 (h) can be computed efficiently for every g ∈ G and h ∈ H. Sometimes this particular problem is what is meant by "constructive recognition".
To find a composition series using [16] , we need only recognition and constructive membership, but the explicit isomorphisms to a standard copy are also very useful. Given these, many problems, including constructive membership, can be reduced to the standard copy. This paper will consider the Suzuki groups Sz(q), q = 2 2m+1 for m > 0, which is one of the infinite families of finite simple groups. We will only consider the natural representation, which has dimension 4, and our standard copy will be Sz(q) defined in Section 2.
In Section 5 we solve the constructive membership problem for Sz(q). In Section 6 we solve the recognition problem for Sz(q), i.e. given X ⊆ GL(4, q) we give an algorithm that decides whether or not X = Sz(q). In Section 7 we consider these problems for conjugates of Sz(q). Given X ⊆ GL(4, q) we give an algorithm that decides whether or not X h = Sz(q) for some h ∈ GL(4, q). We also give an algorithm that computes an isomorphism to Sz(q), by finding some g such that X g = Sz(q).
Other representations are dealt with in [2] . The main objective of this paper is to prove the following: Theorem 1.1. Assuming Conjecture 4.2, and given a random element oracle for subgroups of GL(4, q) and an oracle for the discrete logarithm problem in F q , there exists a Las Vegas algorithm that, for each X ⊆ GL(4, q), with q = 2 2m+1 for some m > 0, such that X h = Sz(q) for some h ∈ GL(4, q), finds g ∈ GL(4, q)
such that X g = Sz(q) and solves the constructive membership problem for X .
The algorithm has time complexity O(log(q)) field operations and also has a preprocessing step, which only needs to be executed once for a given X, with time complexity O(log(q) log log(q) + |X|) field operations. The discrete logarithm oracle is only needed in the preprocessing step.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 7.5, Theorem 5.2, Theorem 5.3 and Theorem 5.4.
In Section 8, experimental evidence for Conjecture 4.2 is shown.
In constructive membership testing for Sz(q), the essential problem is to find elements of even order. In this paper, this is achieved by using the fact that Sz(q) acts doubly transitively on a certain set O ⊆ P 3 (F q ). After finding independent random elements in the stabiliser of a point, which is done by finding elements that map one point to another, it becomes easy to find elements of even order. This is because the structure of the stabiliser of a point is known, and by Proposition 5.1 we can easily find elements of even order in it.
For every cyclic subgroup C of order q − 1, the proportion of double cosets of C in Sz(q) that contain an element that maps one given point to another is high. The need to consider double cosets rather than single cosets arises from the fact that O contains q 2 + 1 points, and most double cosets have size (q − 1) 2 . In the analogous problem for SL(2, q) (see [8] ), which acts on a set with q + 1 points, single cosets of a subgroup of order q − 1 are used.
One can view this as a process of applying permutation group techniques on a set which is exponentially large in terms of the input. Since O has size q 2 +1, we cannot explicitly write down all its points and still have a polynomial time algorithm, and therefore we cannot write down the elements of Sz(q) as permutations. However, given two points we can construct in polynomial time an element of Sz(q) that maps one point to the other, which is a typical permutation group technique.
Implementations of the algorithms are available in Magma (see [5] ). We are very grateful to the anonymous referee for the helpful advice and the large number of comments. We also acknowledge John Bray, Charles LeedhamGreen, Eamonn O'Brien, Geoffrey Robinson, Maud de Visscher and Robert Wilson for their help and encouragement.
The simple Suzuki groups
We begin by defining our standard copy of the Suzuki group. Following [14, Chapter 11] , let π be the unique automorphism of F q such that π 2 (x) = x 2 for every x ∈ F q , i.e. π(x) = x t where t = 2 m+1 . For a, b ∈ F q and c ∈ F × q , define the following matrices.
By definition,
If we define
then F Sz(q) with |F | = q 2 and H ∼ = F × q so that H is cyclic of order q − 1. Moreover, we can write M (c) as
where λ = c (1) The order of the Suzuki group is
There exists O ⊆ P 3 (F q ) on which Sz(q) acts faithfully and doubly transitively, such that no nontrivial element of Sz(q) fixes more than 2 points. This set is
The stabiliser of P ∞ = (1 : 0 : 0 : 0) ∈ O is F H and if P 0 = (0 : 0 : 0 : 1) then the stabiliser of (P ∞ , P 0 ) is H. (5) Z(F ) = {S(0, b) | b ∈ F q } and F H is a Frobenius group with Frobenius kernel F . (6) The number of elements of order q − 1 is φ(q − 1)q 2 (q 2 + 1)/2, where φ is the Euler totient function.
x . (8) Sz(q) has cyclic Hall subgroups U 1 and U 2 of orders q ± t + 1.
From [14, Chapter 11, Remark 3.12] we also immediately obtain the following result. Theorem 2.2. A maximal subgroup of G = Sz(q) is conjugate to one of the following subgroups.
(1) The point stabiliser F H.
(2) The normaliser N G (H), which is dihedral of order 2(q − 1).
The normalisers B i = N G (U i ) for i = 1, 2. These satisfy B i = U i , t i where u ti = u q for every u ∈ U i and [B i : U i ] = 4. (4) Sz(s) where q is a power of s.
If G is a group acting on a set O and P ∈ O, let G P G denote the stabiliser of P in G.
Let Sp(4, q) denote the standard copy of the symplectic group, preserving the following symplectic form:
From [18] and [25, Chapter 3] , we know that the elements of Sz(q) are precisely the fixed points of an automorphism Ψ of Sp(4, q); from [25, Chapter 3] , computing Ψ(g) for some g ∈ Sp(4, q) amounts to taking a submatrix of the exterior square of g and then replacing each matrix entry x by x
If V is an F G-module for some group G and field F , with action f : F G×V → V , and if Φ is an automorphism of G, denote by V Φ the F G-module which has the same elements as V and where the action is given by (g, v) → f (Φ(g), v) for g ∈ G and v ∈ V Φ , extended to F G by linearity.
Lemma 2.3. Let G Sp(4, q) have natural module V and assume that V is absolutely irreducible. Then G h Sz(q) for some h ∈ GL(4, q) if and only if V ∼ = V Ψ .
Proof. Assume G h Sz(q). Both G and Sz(q) preserve the form (2.12), and this form is unique up to a scalar multiple, since V is absolutely irreducible. Therefore
, and hence we may assume that h ∈ Sp(4, q). Let x = hΨ(h −1 ) and observe that for each g ∈ G, Ψ(g h ) = g h . It follows that
Then there is some h ∈ GL(4, q) such that for each g ∈ G we have g h = Ψ(g). As above, since both G and Ψ(G) preserve the form (2.12), we may assume that h ∈ Sp(4, q).
Let K be the algebraic closure of F q . The Steinberg-Lang Theorem (see [22] ) asserts that there exists x ∈ Sp(4, K) such that h = x −1 Ψ(x). It follows that
(2.14)
Sz(q). Thus G is conjugate in GL(4, K) to a subgroup S of Sz(q), and it follows from [10, Theorem 29.7] , that G is conjugate to S in GL(4, q).
Proof. Since |H| = q − 1 it is enough to show that H ∩ H g = 1 . By [14, Chapter 11], H is conjugate to H and distinct conjugates of H intersect trivially. Lemma 2.5. If g ∈ G = Sz(q) is uniformly random, then
and hence we expect to obtain an element of order q − 1 in O(log log q) random selections.
Proof. The first equality follows immediately from Theorem 2.1. The inequality follows from [17, Section II.8] . Now let ε = 1/(12 log log(q)) and δ = e −k for some k ∈ N. If we take uniformly random elements from G, then the probability that we have not found an element of order q − 1 after ⌈log δ/ log (1 − ε)⌉ consecutive tries is at most δ, and log δ
which is O(log log(q)), so the statement follows. Thus the number of elements that fix at least one point is
Lemma 2.7. Elements of odd order in Sz(q) that have the same trace are conjugate.
Proof. From [23] , the number of conjugacy classes of non-identity elements of odd order is q − 1, and all elements of even order have trace 0. Observe that
Since b can be any element of F q , so can Tr (S(0, b)T ), and this also implies that S(0, b)T has odd order when b = 0. Therefore there are q − 1 possible traces for non-identity elements of odd order, and elements with different trace must be nonconjugate, so all conjugacy classes must have different traces.
Preliminaries
We will now briefly discuss some general concepts that are needed later.
3.1. Complexity. We shall be concerned with the time complexity of the algorithms involved, where the basic operations are the field operations, and not the bit operations. In our case, the matrix dimension will always be 4, so all simple arithmetic with matrices can be done using O(1) field operations, and raising a matrix to the O(q) power can be done using O(log q) field operations using the standard method of repeated squaring. We shall also assume an oracle for the discrete logarithm problem for F q , so that this can be solved using O(1) field operations. We will need to find an element of order q − 1. The order can be computed using the algorithm of [6] . To obtain the precise order, this algorithm requires a factorisation of q − 1, otherwise it might return a multiple of the correct order.
However, it suffices for our purposes to learn a pseudo-order of the element, which is a multiple of its order, since it will suffice to find a nontrivial element of order dividing q − 1. Hence we avoid the requirement to factorise q − 1. The algorithm of [6] can also be used to obtain the pseudo-order, and for this it has time complexity O(log (q) log log (q)) field operations.
3.2. Straight line programs. For constructive membership testing, we want to express an element of a group G = X as a word in X. Actually, it should be a straight line program, abbreviated to SLP. If we express the elements as words, the length of the words might be too large, requiring exponential space complexity.
An SLP is a data structure for words, which ensures that subwords occurring multiple times are computed only once. Formally, given a set of generators X, an SLP is a sequence (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) where each s i represents one of the following
• an x ∈ X • a product s j s k , where j, k < i • a power s n j where j < i and n ∈ Z • a conjugate s s k j where j, k < i so s i is either a pointer into X, a pair of pointers to earlier elements of the sequence, or a pointer to an earlier element and an integer.
Thus to construct an SLP for a word, one starts by listing pointers to the generators of X, and then builds up the word. To evaluate the SLP, go through the sequence and perform the specified operations. Since we use pointers to the elements of X, we can immediately evaluate the SLP on another set Y of the same size as X, by just changing the pointers so that they point to elements of Y .
Random elements.
Our analysis assumes that we can construct uniformly distributed random elements of a group G defined by a generating set X. The polynomial time algorithm of [3] produces nearly uniformly distributed random elements; an alternative polynomial time algorithm is the product replacement algorithm of [7] . We will assume that we have a random element oracle, which produces a uniformly random element using O(1) field operations, and automatically gives it as an SLP in X.
An important issue is the length of the SLPs that are computed. The length of the SLPs must be polynomial, otherwise it would not be polynomial time to evaluate them. We assume that SLPs of random elements have length O(1).
Las Vegas algorithms.
All the algorithms we consider are probabilistic of the type known as Las Vegas algorithms. This type of algorithm is discussed in [24, Section 25.8] , [20, Section 1.3] and [12, Section 3.2.1]. In short it is a probabilistic algorithm with an input parameter ε that either returns failure, with probability at most ε, or otherwise returns a correct result. The time complexity naturally depends on ε.
We present Las Vegas algorithms as probabilistic algorithms that either return a correct result, with probability bounded below by 1/p(n) for some polynomial p(n) in the size n of the input, or otherwise return failure. By enclosing such an algorithm in a loop that iterates ⌈log ε/ log (1 − 1/p(n))⌉ times, we obtain an algorithm that returns failure with probability at most ε, and hence is a Las Vegas algorithm in the above sense. Clearly if the enclosed algorithm is polynomial time, the Las Vegas algorithm is polynomial time.
One can also enclose the algorithm in a loop that iterates until the algorithm returns a correct result, thus obtaining a probabilistic time complexity, and the expected number of iterations is then O(p(n)).
Computing an element of a stabiliser
As explained in the introduction, in constructive membership testing for Sz(q) the essential problem is to find an element of the stabiliser of a given point P ∈ O, expressed as an SLP in our given generators X of G = Sz(q). The idea is to map P to Q = P by a random g 1 ∈ G, and then compute g 2 ∈ G such that P g 2 = Q, so that
Thus the problem is to find an element that maps P to Q, and the idea is to look for it in double cosets of cyclic subgroups of order q − 1. We first give an overview of the method.
Begin by selecting random a, h ∈ G such that a has pseudo-order q − 1, and consider the equation
in the two indeterminates i, j. If we can solve this equation for i and j, thus obtaining positive integers k, l such that 1 k, l q − 1 and P a l ha k = Q, then we have an element that maps P to Q.
Since a has order dividing q − 1, by [14, Chapter 11] , a is conjugate to a matrix
q . This implies that we can diagonalise a and obtain a matrix x ∈ GL(4, q) such that M ′ (λ) x = a. It follows that if we define
Now change indeterminates to α and β by letting α = λ j and β = λ i , so that we obtain the following equation:
This determines four equations in α and β, and in Section 4.1 we will describe how to find solutions for them.
∈ H, and hence also c, d ∈ H = H x . If |a| = q − 1 then a = H, so that there exists positive integers k and l as above with a l = c and a k = d, and these integers can be found by computing discrete logarithms, since we also have λ l = γ and λ k = δ. Hence we obtain a solution to (4.1) from the solution to (4.3). If |a| is a proper divisor of q − 1, then it might happen that c / ∈ a or d / ∈ a , but by Lemma 2.5 we know that this is unlikely. Thus the overall algorithm is as in Algorithm 1. We show the time complexity of the algorithm in Section 4.2 and prove that it is correct in Section 4.3.
Solving equation (4.3).
We will now show how to obtain the solutions of (4.3). It might happen that there are no solutions, in which case the method described here will detect this and return with failure.
By letting P ′ = (q 1 : q 2 : q 3 : q 4 ), Q ′ = (r 1 : r 2 : r 3 : r 4 ) and g = [g i,j ], we can write out (4.3) and obtain
for some constant C ∈ F q . Henceforth, we assume that r i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , 4, since this is the difficult case, and also extremely likely when q is large, as can be seen from Proposition 4.1. A method similar to the one described in this section will solve (4.3) when some r i = 0 and Algorithm 1 does not assume that all r i = 0.
Algorithm 1: FindMappingElement Data: Generating set X for G = Sz(q) and points P = Q ∈ O Result: An element g of G, written as an SLP in X, such that P g = Q /* Assumes the existence of a function SolveEquation that solves (4.3), if possible. Also, assumes that the function Random returns an element as an SLP in X, and that DiscreteLog returns a positive integer if a discrete logarithm exists and 0 otherwise. */ begin
Let (γ, δ) be a solution. 
Now it follows that
since in a field a polynomial of degree t has at most t roots. The result follows by observing that t = √ 2q.
For convenience, we denote the expressions in the parentheses at the left hand sides of (4.4) as K, L, M and N respectively. Then if we let C = Lβr 
and in particular β is a function of α, since
By substituting the first two equations into the third in (4.8) we obtain
and by raising the first equation to the t-th power and substituting into the second, we obtain
3 and proceed similarly, we obtain two more equations
Now (4.10), (4.11), (4.12) and (4.13) are equations in α only, and by multiplying them by suitable powers of α, they can be turned into polynomial equations such that α only occurs to the powers ti for i = 1, . . . , 4 and to lower powers that are independent of t. The suitable powers of α are 2t + 2, t + t/2 + 2, 2t + 3 and 2t + t/2 + 2, respectively. Thus we obtain the following four equations.
The c i and d j are polynomials in α with degree independent of t, for i = 1, . . . , 16 and j = 1, . . . , 4 respectively, so (4.14) can be considered a linear system in the variables α nt for n = 1, . . . , 4, with coefficients c i and d j . Now the aim is to obtain a single polynomial in α of bounded degree. For this we need the following conjecture.
Conjecture 4.2. For every
where P, Q ∈ O, h ∈ G and x ∈ GL(4, q), if we regard (4.14) as simultaneous linear equations in the variables α nt for n = 1, . . . , 4, over the polynomial ring F q [α], then it has non-zero determinant.
In other words, the determinant of the coefficients c i is not the zero polynomial. We comment on the validity of Conjecture 4.2 in Section 8. 
Proof. So far in this section we have shown that if we can solve (4.14) we can also solve (4.3). From the four equations of (4.14) we can eliminate α t . We can solve for α 4t from the fourth equation, and substitute into the third, thus obtaining a rational expression with no occurrence of α 4t . Continuing this way and substituting into the other equations, we obtain an expression for α t in terms of the c i and the d i only. This can be substituted into any of the equations of (4.14), where α nt for n = 1, . . . , 4 is obtained by powering up the expression for α t . Thus we obtain a rational expression f 1 (α) of degree independent of t. We now take f (α) to be the numerator of f 1 .
In other words, we think of the α nt as independent variables and of (4.14) as a linear system over these variables, with coefficients in F q [α]. By Conjecture 4.2 we can solve this linear system. Two possible problems can occur: f is identically zero or some of the denominators of the expressions for α nt , n = 1, . . . , 4 turn out to be 0. However, Conjecture 4.2 rules out these possibilities. By Cramer's rule, the expression for α t is a rational expression where the numerator is a determinant, so it consists of sums of products of c i and d j . Each product consists of three c i and one d j . By considering the calculations leading up to (4.14), it is clear that each of the products has degree at most 15. Therefore the expression for α 4t and hence also f (α) has degree at most 60.
We have only done elementary algebra to obtain f (α) from (4.14), and it is clear that (4.14) was obtained from (4. Proof. Let f (α) be the polynomial constructed in Lemma 4.3. To find all solutions to (4.3), we find the zeros γ of f (α), compute the corresponding δ for each zero γ using (4.9), and check which pairs (γ, δ) satisfy (4.4). These pairs must be all solutions of (4.3).
The only work needed is simple matrix arithmetic, finding the roots of a polynomial of bounded degree over F q , and raising matrices to the power t, where t ∈ O(q). Hence the time complexity is O(log q) field operations and the algorithm is Las Vegas since by [24, Corollary 14.16 ] the algorithm for finding the roots of f (α) is Las Vegas with this time complexity.
By following the procedure outlined in Lemma 4.3, it is straightforward to obtain an expression for f (α), where the coefficients are expressions in the entries of g, P ′ and Q ′ , but we will not display it here, since it would take up too much space.
Complexity.
Theorem 4.5. Given an oracle for the discrete logarithm problem in F q and a random element oracle for G, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(log(q) log log (q)) field operations.
Proof. Diagonalising a matrix uses O(log q) field operations, since it involves finding the eigenvalues, i.e. finding the roots of a polynomial of constant degree over F q , see [24, Corollary 14.16] .
Computing the pseudo-order of a matrix uses O(log(q) log log (q)) field operations, if we use the algorithm described in [6] . From Corollary 4.4, it follows that line 1 uses O(log q) field operations.
Finally, line 1 uses O(log q) field operations, since the exponents are O(q). We conclude that Algorithm 1 uses O(log (q) log log (q)) field operations.
4.3.
Correctness. There are two issues when considering the correctness of Algorithm 1. Using the notation in the algorithm, we have to show that (4.3) has a solution with high probability, and that the integers k and l are positive with high probability.
The algorithm in Corollary 4.4 tries to find an element in the double coset HgH, where g = h x −1 , and we will see that this succeeds with high probability when g / ∈ N G (H), which is very likely. If the element a has order precisely q − 1, then from the discussion at the beginning of Section 4, we know that the integers k and l will be positive. By Lemma 2.5 we know that it is likely that a has order precisely q − 1 rather than just a divisor of q − 1.
Hence it follows that Algorithm 1 has high probability of success. We formalise this argument in the following results.
Lemma 4.6. Assume Conjecture 4.2. Let G = Sz(q) and let P ∈ O and a, h ∈ G be given, such that |a| = q − 1. Let Q ∈ O be uniformly random.
where f (α) is the polynomial constructed in Lemma 4.
2 . On the other hand, for every Q ∈ O we have
since this is the equation we consider in Section 4.1, and from Lemma 4.3 we know that all solutions must be roots of f . Thus |P a h a | | a h a | / deg f . Since Q is uniformly random from O, and |O| = q 2 + 1, the result follows. If h ∈ N G ( a ) then a h a = h a and |P h a | = | a | if a does not fix P h. By [14, Chapter 11] , the number of cyclic subgroups of order q − 1 is |O| 2 and |O| − 1 such subgroups fix P h. Moreover, if a fixes P h then P h a = {P h}. Thus
and the result follows.
Theorem 4.7. Assuming Conjecture 4.2 and given a random element oracle for G and an oracle for the discrete logarithm problem in F q , Algorithm 1 is a Las Vegas algorithm that with probability s returns an element mapping P to Q, where
Proof. We use the notation from the algorithm. Let g = h
and Q ′ = Qx −1 . Corollary 4.4 implies that line 1 will succeed if Q ′ ∈ P ′ HgH. If |a| = q−1, then H = a , and the previous condition is equivalent to Q ∈ P a h a .
Moreover, if |a| = q −1 then line 1 will always succeed. It might of course succeed when |a| is a proper divisor of q − 1, so it follows that s satisfies the following inequality.
Since h is uniformly random, using Theorem 2.2 we obtain
From Lemma 2.5 and Lemma 4.6 we obtain
and the probability of success follows from Lemma 2.5.
Clearly if a solution is returned, it is correct, so the algorithm is Las Vegas.
Corollary 4.8. Assuming Conjecture 4.2 and given a random element oracle for subgroups of GL(4, q) and an oracle for the discrete logarithm problem in F q , there exists a Las Vegas algorithm that, given X ⊆ GL(4, q) such that G = X = Sz(q) and P ∈ O, finds a uniformly random g ∈ G P , expressed as an SLP in X. The algorithm has time complexity O(log(q) log log(q)) field operations. If s is as in Theorem 4.7, the probability of success is
Proof. We compute g as follows.
(1) Find random x ∈ G. Let Q = P x and return with failure if P = Q.
(2) Use Algorithm 1 to find y ∈ G such that Qy = P . (3) Now g = xy ∈ G P . Clearly this is a Las Vegas algorithm with probability of success as stated. Moreover, the dominating term in the complexity is the call to Algorithm 1, with time complexity given by Theorem 4.5.
The element g will be expressed as an SLP in X, since x is random and elements from Algorithm 1 are expressed as SLPs.
Each call to Algorithm 1 uses independent random elements, so the double cosets under consideration are uniformly random and independent. Therefore the elements returned by Algorithm 1 must be uniformly random. This implies that g is uniformly random.
Constructive membership testing
We will now give an algorithm for constructive membership testing in Sz(q). Given a set of generators X, such that G = X = Sz(q), and given g ∈ G, we want to express g as an SLP in X. We need the following result.
Proposition 5.1. If g 1 , g 2 ∈ F H are uniformly random, then
Proof. Let A = F H/ Z(F ). By Theorem 2.1, [g 1 , g 2 ] ∈ F and has order 4 if and only if [g 1 , g 2 ] / ∈ Z(F ) ⊳ F H. It therefore suffices to find the proportion of pairs
If k 1 = 1 then k 2 can be any element of A, which contributes q(q − 1) pairs. If 1 = k 1 ∈ F/ Z(F ) ∼ = F q then C A (k 1 ) = F / Z(F ), so we again obtain q(q − 1) pairs. Finally, if k 1 / ∈ F/ Z(F ) then |C A (k 1 )| = q − 1 so we obtain q(q − 2)(q − 1) pairs. Thus we obtain q 2 (q − 1) pairs from a total of |A × A| = q 2 (q − 1) 2 pairs, and the result follows.
The algorithm for constructive membership testing has a preprocessing step and a main step. The preprocessing step consists of finding "standard generators" for O 2 (G P∞ ) = F and O 2 (G P0 ). In the case of O 2 (G P∞ ) the standard generators are defined as matrices {S(a i ,
for some unspecified x i ∈ F q , such that {a 1 , . . . , a n } and {b 1 , . . . , b n } form vector space bases of F q over F 2 (so n = log 2 q = 2m + 1).
For every a, b ∈ F q , every matrix S(a, b) ∈ G P∞ can be reduced to the identity by multiplying it by some of the standard generators of O 2 (G P∞ ), and similarly for G P0 . The standard generators are therefore used in the main step to perform row operations in G P∞ and G P0 .
Theorem 5.2. Assuming Conjecture 4.2 and given a random element oracle for G and an oracle for the discrete logarithm problem in F q , the preprocessing step is a Las Vegas algorithm that finds standard generators for O 2 (G P∞ ) and O 2 (G P0 ). The preprocessing step has time complexity O(log(q) log log(q)) field operations. The probability of success is at least
where r is the success probability of the algorithm described in Corollary 4.8.
Proof. The preprocessing step is the following:
(1) Find random a 1 , a 2 ∈ G P∞ and b 1 , b 2 ∈ G P0 using the algorithm described in Corollary 4.8. Let 
and similarly we obtain U for O 2 (G P0 ).
It follows from (2.9) and (2.10) that (5.3) provides the standard generators for G P∞ . These are expressed as SLPs in X, since this is true for the elements returned from the algorithm described in Corollary 4.8.
By Corollary 4.8, the first step succeeds with probability r 4 , and the random elements selected are uniformly distributed and independent. Since G P∞ = F H, the proportion of elements of order q − 1 in G P∞ is φ(q − 1)/(q − 1), and similarly for G P0 . Hence by Proposition 5.1, the second step succeeds with probability at least (φ(q − 1)
, the third step will also succeed, since λ will not lie in a proper subfield. Hence O 2 (G P∞ ) < Y ∞ G P∞ and Y ∞ = G P∞ precisely when d 1 has order q − 1, and similarly for Y 0 .
By the remark preceding the theorem, L determines two sets of field elements {a 1 , . . . , a 2m+1 } and {b 1 , . . . , b 2m+1 }. In this case each a i = aλ i and b i = bλ i(t+1) , for some fixed a, b ∈ F × q , where λ is as in the algorithm. Since λ does not lie in a proper subfield, these sets form vector space bases of F q over F 2 .
It then follows from Lemma 2.5 and Corollary 4.8 that the probability of success of the preprocessing step is as stated. Therefore the preprocessing step is a Las Vegas algorithm.
We only determine if d 1 and d 2 have order dividing q − 1 in order to obtain a polynomial time algorithm. To determine if λ lies in a proper subfield it suffices to determine if |λ| | 2 n − 1 where n is a proper divisor of 2m + 1. Hence the dominating term in the complexity is the computation of random elements in the stabiliser, in the first step. The time complexity is therefore the same as for the algorithm described in Corollary 4.8. Now we consider the algorithm that expresses g as an SLP in X. It is given formally as Algorithm 2.
Let W be an SLP for (h ab z −1
2 ) Theorem 5.3. Given a random element oracle for G, Algorithm 2 is a Las Vegas algorithm with probability of success 1/2 + O(1/q).
Proof. First observe that since r is randomly chosen we obtain it as an SLP. On line 2 we check if gr fixes a point, and from Lemma 2.6 we see that
The elements found at lines 2 and 2 can be computed using row operations, so we can obtain them as SLPs.
The element h found at line 2 clearly has trace x, and it can be computed using row operations, so we obtain it as an SLP. From Lemma 2.7 we know that h is conjugate to M ′ (λ) and therefore must fix 2 points of O. Hence lines 2 and 2 make sense, and the elements found can again be computed using row operations and therefore we obtain them as SLPs.
The only elements in H that are conjugate to h are M ′ (λ) ±1 , so clearly h ab must be one of them.
Finally, the elements that make up W were found as SLPs, and it is clear that if we evaluate W we obtain g. Hence the algorithm is Las Vegas and the theorem follows.
Complexity.
Theorem 5.4. Given a random element oracle for G, Algorithm 2 has time complexity O(log q) field operations, space complexity O(log 2 q) and the length of the returned SLP is O(log q).
Proof. From (5.3) we see that the number of standard generators is O(log q), and each matrix uses O(log q) space, so the space complexity of the algorithm is O(log 2 q). This also immediately implies that the row operations performed at lines 2, 2, 2, 2 and 2 use O(log q) field operations.
Finding the fixed points of h, and performing the check at line 2 only amounts to considering eigenspaces, which uses O(log q) field operations. Thus the time complexity of the algorithm is O(log q) field operations.
The SLPs returned from Algorithm 1 have length O(1), and (5.3) implies that each standard generator also has length O(1). Hence because of our row operations, W will have length O(log q).
Recognition
We now discuss how to recognise Sz(q). We are given a set X ⊆ GL(4, q) and we want to decide whether or not X = Sz(q), the group defined in (2.4).
To do this, it suffices to determine if X ⊆ Sz(q) and if X does not generate a proper subgroup, i.e. if X is not contained in a maximal subgroup. To determine if g ∈ X is in Sz(q), first determine if det(g) = 1, then determine if g preserves the symplectic form of Sp(4, q) and finally determine if g is a fixed point of the automorphism Ψ of Sp(4, q), mentioned in Section 2.
The recognition algorithm relies on the following result.
Lemma 6.1. Let H = X Sz(q) = G, where X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and let C = {[x i , x j ] | 1 i < j n} and M be the natural module of H. Then H = G if and only if the following hold:
(1) M is an absolutely irreducible H-module.
(2) H is not conjugate in GL(4, q) to a subgroup of GL(4, r), where q is a proper power of r. (3) C = {1} and for every c ∈ C \ {1} there exists x ∈ X such that [c, c
x ] = 1.
Proof. By Theorem 2.2, the maximal subgroups of G that do not satisfy the first two conditions are N G (H), B 1 and B 2 . For each, the derived group is contained in the normalised cyclic group, so all these maximal subgroups are metabelian. If H is contained in one of them and H is not abelian, then C = {1}, but [c, c x ] = 1 for every c ∈ C and x ∈ X since the second derived group of H is trivial. Hence the last condition is not satisfied.
Conversely, assume that H = G. Then clearly, the first two conditions are satisfied, and C = {1}. Assume that the last condition is false, so for some c ∈ C \ {1} we have that [c, c x ] = 1 for every x ∈ X. This implies that c
and it follows from Theorem 2.1 that C G (c) = C G (c)
but G is simple and we have a contradiction. Theorem 6.2. There exists a Las Vegas algorithm that, given X ⊆ GL(4, q), decides whether or not X = Sz(q). Its time complexity is O(|X| 2 ) field operations.
Proof. The algorithm proceeds as follows.
(1) Determine if every x ∈ X is in Sz(q), and return false if not.
(2) Determine if X is absolutely irreducible and if it is not conjugate in GL(4, q) to a subgroup of GL(4, r), where q is a proper power of r. Return false if any of these turn out to be false. (3) Using the notation of Lemma 6.1, try to find c ∈ C such that c = 1. Return false if it cannot be found.
x ] = 1 for some x ∈ X, then return true, else return false. From the discussion at the beginning of this section, the first step is easily done using O(|X|) field operations. The MeatAxe (see [13] and [15] ) can be used to determine if the natural module is absolutely irreducible; the algorithm of [11] can be used to determine if X is conjugate in GL(4, q) to a subgroup of GL(4, r), where q is a proper power of r. Both these algorithms have time complexity O(|X|) field operations.
The rest of the algorithm is a straightforward application of the last condition in Lemma 6.1, except that it is sufficient to use the condition for one nontrivial commutator c. It follows immediately that the time complexity of the algorithm is O(|X| 2 ) field operations. Since the MeatAxe is Las Vegas, this algorithm is also Las Vegas.
The conjugation problem
Given a conjugate G of Sz(q) we describe an algorithm to construct an isomorphism from G to Sz(q) by finding a conjugating element. As one component, we need another recognition algorithm for G, since the one described in Section 6 only works for the standard copy of Sz(q). In [4] , a general recognition algorithm is described which could be used, but we prefer the very fast algorithm described below, which works for this special case. 7.1. Recognition. We want to determine if a given group G = X GL(4, q) is a conjugate of Sz(q), without finding a conjugating element. We consider carefully the subgroups of Sp(4, q) and rule out all except those isomorphic to Sz(q). This relies on the fact that, up to Galois automorphisms, Sz(q) has only one equivalence class of faithful representations in GL(4, q) (see [21] ), so if we can show that G ∼ = Sz(q) then G is a conjugate of Sz(q).
Theorem 7.1. There exists a Las Vegas algorithm that, given X ⊆ GL(4, q), decides whether or not X h = Sz(q) for some h ∈ GL(4, q). The algorithm has time complexity O(|X| 2 ) field operations.
Proof. Let G = X . The algorithm proceeds as follows.
(1) Determine if G is absolutely irreducible, using the MeatAxe, and return false if not. (2) Determine if G preserves a non-zero symplectic form M . If so we conclude that G is a subgroup of a conjugate of Sp(4, q), and if not then return false. This is essentially isomorphism testing of modules, which is described in [13] . Since G is absolutely irreducible, the form is unique up to a scalar multiple. (3) Conjugate G so that it preserves the form J. This amounts to finding a symplectic basis, i.e. finding an invertible matrix X such that XJX T = M , which is easily done. Then G X preserves the form J and thus G X Sp(4, q) so that we can apply Ψ. (4) Determine if V ∼ = V Ψ , where V is the natural module for G and Ψ is the automorphism from Lemma 2.3. If so we conclude that G is a subgroup of some conjugate of Sz(q), and if not then return false. (5) Determine if G is a proper subgroup of Sz(q), i.e. if it is contained in a maximal subgroup. This can be done using Lemma 6.1. If so, then return false, else return true. The algorithms for finding a preserved form and for module isomorphism testing are Las Vegas, with the same time complexity as the MeatAxe (see [13] and [15] ), which is O(|X|) field operations since G has constant degree. Hence we obtain a Las Vegas algorithm, with the same time complexity as the algorithm from Theorem 6.2.
7.2. Finding a conjugating element. Now we assume that we are given G GL(4, q) such that G h = Sz(q) for some h ∈ GL(4, q), and we turn to the problem of finding some g ∈ GL(4, q) such that G g = Sz(q), thus obtaining an isomorphism from any conjugate of Sz(q) to the standard copy.
Lemma 7.2. Given a random element oracle for subgroups of GL(4, q), there exists a Las Vegas algorithm that, given X ⊆ GL(4, q) such that X h = Sz(q) for some
The algorithm has time complexity O(log q) field operations.
Proof. Clearly O h −1 is the set on which X acts doubly transitively. For a matrix M ′ (λ) ∈ Sz(q) we see that the eigenspaces corresponding to the eigenvalues λ ±(t+1)
will be in O. Moreover, every element of order dividing q − 1 in every conjugate G of Sz(q) will have eigenvalues of the form µ ±(t+1) , µ ±1 for some µ ∈ F × q , and the eigenspaces corresponding to µ ±(t+1) will lie in the set on which G acts doubly transitively.
Hence to find a point P ∈ O h −1 it suffices to find a random g ∈ X of order dividing q − 1, which is easy by Lemma 2.5, and then find the eigenspaces of g.
Clearly this is a Las Vegas algorithm that uses O(log q) field operations.
Lemma 7.3. There exists a Las Vegas algorithm that, given X ⊆ GL(4, q) such that
, finds a diagonal matrix e ∈ GL(4, q) such that X e = Sz(q), using O(|X| + log q) field operations.
Proof. Let G = X . Since G d = Sz(q), G must preserve the symplectic form
where J is given by (2.12). Using [13] , we can find this form, which is determined up to a scalar multiple. Hence the diagonal matrix e = diag(e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ) that we want to find is also determined up to a scalar multiple (and up to multiplication by a diagonal matrix in Sz(q)).
Since e must take J to K, we must have
The matrix e is determined up to a scalar multiple, so we can choose e 4 = 1 and e 1 = K 1,4 . Hence it only remains to determine e 2 and e 3 .
To conjugate G into Sz(q) we must have P e ∈ O for every point P ∈ O then e 3 = y 1−t/2 . Thus instead of (7.2) we obtain a linear equation
in the variables x, y. Thus the complete algorithm for finding e proceeds as follows.
(1) Find the form K that is preserved by G, using [13] .
(2) Find P, Q ∈ O d −1 using Lemma 7.2. (3) Let P = (p 1 : p 2 : p 3 : p 4 ) and Q = (q 1 : q 2 : q 3 : q 4 ). Determine if the following linear system in the variables x and y is singular, and if so return with failure. p
(7.4) (4) Let (α, β) be a solution to the linear system. The diagonal matrix e = diag(K 1,4 , √ α t , β 1−t/2 , 1) now satisfies that G e = Sz(q).
By Lemma 7.2 and [13] , this is a Las Vegas algorithm that uses O(|X| + log q) field operations.
Lemma 7.4. There exists a Las Vegas algorithm that, given subsets X, Y P and
. The algorithm has time complexity O(|X|) field operations.
Proof. Notice that the natural module V = F 4 q of F H is uniserial with four nonzero submodules, namely
Hence the same is true for Y P and Y Q (but the submodules will be different) since they lie in conjugates of F H. Now the algorithm proceeds as follows.
(1) Let V = F 4 q be the natural module for Y P and Y Q . Find composition
Now let k be the matrix such that k −1 has u i as row i, for i = 1, . . . , 4.
We now motivate the second step of the algorithm. Let (M ) i denote the i-th row of a matrix M , and let V P i and V Q i be as in the algorithm. We may assume that Y P = {x, y}, Y Q = {u, v} where |x| = |u| = 4 and both |y| and |v| divide q − 1 (and y and v are nontrivial).
There exists g ′ ∈ Sz(q) such that P hg ′ = P ∞ and Qhg ′ = P 0 , since Sz(q) acts doubly transitively on O. If we let z = hg ′ , then Y P z and Y Q z consist of lower and upper triangular matrices, respectively. Hence there exist a 1 , b 1 ∈ F q such that x = S(a 1 , b 1 ) z −1 , and then V
1 so by choosing some non-zero vector in V P scalar multiple of the first row of z −1 . Similarly, there exist a 2 , b 2 ∈ F q such that Thus the matrix k found in the algorithm satisfies that z = kd for some diagonal matrix d ∈ GL(4, q). Since Sz(q) = G h = G z = (G k ) d , the algorithm returns a correct result, and it is Las Vegas because the MeatAxe is Las Vegas (see [13] and [15] ). Clearly the time complexity is the same as the MeatAxe, so the algorithm uses O(|X|) field operations.
Theorem 7.5. Assuming Conjecture 4.2 and given a random element oracle for subgroups of GL(4, q), there exists a Las Vegas algorithm that, given X ⊆ GL(4, q) such that X h = Sz(q) for some h ∈ GL(4, q), finds g ∈ GL(4, q) such that X g = Sz(q). The algorithm has time complexity O(log(q) log log(q) + |X|) field operations.
Proof. Let G = X . First note that g is determined up to multiplication by an element of Sz(q), so we will find g such that hg ′ = g where g ′ ∈ Sz(q). The algorithm described in Corollary 4.8 works equally well for a conjugate of Sz(q), so we can find generators for a stabiliser of a point in G, using the algorithm described in Theorem 5.2. In this case we do not need the elements as SLPs, so a discrete log oracle is not necessary. 
Implementation and performance
An implementation of the algorithms described here is available in Magma. The implementation uses the existing Magma implementations of the algorithms described in [6] , [7] , [11] , [13] and [24, Corollary 14.16] .
A benchmark of the recognition algorithm described in Section 7.1, for various field sizes q = 2 2m+1 , is given in Figure 8 .1. For each field size, 200 random conjugates of Sz(q) were recognised and the average running time for each call is displayed.
A benchmark of the conjugation algorithm described in Section 7.2, for various field sizes q = 2 2m+1 , is given in Figure 8 .2. For each field size, 100 random conjugates of Sz(q) were considered and a conjugating element found. The average running time for each call is displayed.
The constructive membership and conjugation algorithms both need to compute generating sets of stabilisers, so they depend on Algorithm 1. Therefore our implementation depends on the Magma implementation of discrete log. Since we are in characteristic 2, there is a specialised algorithm for discrete log, Coppersmith's algorithm (see [9] ), which is implemented in Magma. We have benchmarked the computation of generating sets for stabilisers, for various field sizes, as shown in Figure 8 .3. For each field size, q = 2 2m+1 , generating sets for the stabilisers of 100 random points were computed, and the average running time for each call is listed. The amount of this time that was spent in discrete logarithm computations is also indicated.
We used the software package R (see [19] ), to produce Figures 8.1, 8 .2 and 8.3. All benchmarks were carried out using Magma V2.12-9, on a PC with an Intel Xeon CPU running at 2.8 GHz and with 1 GB of RAM. For the conjugation problem, the highest value of m was 55, since higher field sizes required too much memory. For the recognition and stabiliser computation, there was never any shortage of memory, and the benchmark indicated that much larger fields should also be feasible. The expectation was that the conjugation problem and the stabiliser computation would be much more time consuming than the recognition, and in order to shorten the total time, 100 rather than 200 computations were performed for each field size. The benchmark confirmed this expectation.
Moreover, the benchmark was also used as a way to check Conjecture 4.2. Each stabiliser computation involves at least 2 calls to Algorithm 1, so at least 14000 checks of the conjecture was made during the benchmark. The fact that it never failed provides strong evidence to support the conjecture. 
